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Abstract 
This paper assesses the performance of the core inflation measures 
calculated by the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB). The evidence shows that 
they do not meet some key statistical criteria that a good core inflation 
should have: unbiasedness and the ability to forecast inflation. That 
performance stems, to a large extent, from the lack of a well-grounded 
statistical and economical basis behind them. Three new measures are 
built and assessed using the same criteria. The evidence shows that their 
behaviour is more in accordance to what the theory claims. However, they 
still lack the ability to help forecasting inflation. Hence both the BCB and 
the market should use core inflation cautiously. 
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“After a jittery few weeks, bond markets rallied on 
June 15th on news that America’s core consumer price 
index rose by just 0.1% in May. (…) What markets 
blithely ignored was the day’s bad news. Headline 
consumer prices rose by 0.7%, the biggest monthly 
increase for nearly two years. (…) For bond prices to 
rise on such a big jump in inflation, markets must be 
placing a great deal of faith in the core index as the 
true gauge’ 
 
(The Economist, June 2007) 
 
 
1 – Introduction 
 
Boosted by the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) frameworks by several 
central banks since the end of the 1980s, core inflation has increasingly become 
popular among policymakers and market participants. That popularity has not been, 
however, endorsed by their actual performance. Dismal evidence on their 
accomplishments, questions about their real capabilities as well as criticism on the 
weight some central banks give to them have been growing. This should not come as 
a complete surprise given, for example, the well-known difficulties in separating 
inflation noise from signal. 
Curiously, however, since core inflation measures have begun to be calculated 
in Brazil, in 2000, following the adoption of the IT regime, they have remained 
unquestioned. This is surprising not only because of the dissent mentioned above but 
also because of how they have fared so far. Moreover, the Brazilian economy has 
historically being subject to frequent economic shocks. In reality, not only core 
inflation is closely watched by market participants in Brazil – as elsewhere – but there 
has been a widespread emergence of “alternative” core inflation measures, such as 
core for tradables, non tradables and service goods, among others (e.g. A. C. Pastore 
& Associados, 2008).1 An exception to that complacency is the paper of da Silva 
Filho (2007), who shows disturbing evidence regarding the performance of the so-
called exclusion core in Brazil. 
This paper not only is the first one to assess the three core inflation measures 
that have been calculated by the Central Bank of Brazil since 2000, but also aims to 
look at core inflation on a broader perspective. Firstly, it assesses whether those 
                                                 
1
 For example, Schwartsman (2008), a former BCB’s Deputy Governor, argued emphatically that the 
acceleration of inflation at the time had a permanent nature since core inflation was also rising. 
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measures are doing a good job (i.e. are they delivering what one expects from a good 
core inflation measure in terms of its statistical properties?). Secondly, it proposes 
new – theoretically sounder – measures of core inflation for Brazil.2 Finally, the 
overall results are assessed taken into account evidence for other countries, aiming at 
building a broader picture about the real capabilities of core inflation. 
The evidence shows that core inflation measures have not been doing a good 
job in Brazil. Their bias is either statistically significant or economically relevant. 
Moreover, they have poor dynamics and do not seem helpful in explaining near term 
inflation. Three new core measures are built and assessed: two exclusion cores and a 
double weighted core. The results show that they have better statistical properties, 
especially regarding the bias criterion. Nevertheless, despite the improvements they 
remain adding little information, beyond that already contained in the history of 
headline inflation, to explain near term inflation. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 gives a glimpse on the core 
inflation debate. Section 3 presents what the literature considers to be the most 
desirable properties of a good core inflation measure. Section 4 introduces the core 
measures calculated by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), and assesses their 
performance since 1996, with special emphasis on the IT period. Section 5 introduces 
three new measures of core inflation for Brazil. Section 6 evaluates those measures 
and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2 – Core Inflation: Where Do We Stand? 
 
Core inflation measures are around us since the 1970s, and ever since both the 
public and economists have generally taken them for granted. However, despite their 
popularity and widespread use by policymakers, core inflation remains a controversial 
matter. The dissent, which has been growing in recent years, can be viewed on several 
dimensions. On theoretical grounds, economists could not even agree on what core 
inflation means. The most popular definition associates core inflation to underlying 
inflation, or, in other words, to what remains after the “noise” is taken out from the 
inflation rate. Noise stands for temporary price developments. As puts Blinder (1997) 
                                                 
2
 Notice that, as of January 2010, influenced by a preliminary version of this work, the Central Bank of 
Brazil decided to stop calculating two measures of core inflation and to adopt two others that have been 
presented here (see Inflation Report, December 2009). 
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“The name of the game then was distinguishing the signal from the noise, which was 
often difficult.” Perhaps, more intuitively, core inflation could be seen as a measure 
that uncovers the “true” underlying trend of inflation (Bryan et al., 1997). The trend 
would represent the most persistent, enduring or durable part of inflation. 
Core inflation has also been defined in a related but different viewpoint, based 
on its forecasting ability. In that case it is considered to be that part of inflation that is 
most helpful to predict headline inflation. Blinder (1997) argues that: “To me, the 
durable part of the information in each monthly inflation report was the part that was 
useful in medium - and near-term inflation forecasting.” It has been defined (or 
expressed) in other ways as well, such as that part of inflation which is most 
correlated to money growth (Brian and Cecchetti, 1994), the part which is not 
correlated to medium-long run real output (Quah and Vahey, 1995), or that 
component of inflation common to a large number of individual price series (Bryan 
and Cecchetti, 1993), among others. 
On practical grounds, despite its increasing use by central banks in recent 
years – which has been boosted by the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) regimes in 
several countries – there has been some disenchantment with core inflation. From a 
policymaker’s perspective, for example, some central banks that used to establish 
their inflation targets in terms of core inflation (Australia, New Zealand and Czech 
Republic), have changed their minds and now aim at keeping inflation in line with 
targets set for headline inflation. In other cases, the targeted indexes, which excluded 
interest rates effects, have been ruled out in favour of headline inflation (e.g. South 
Africa and the UK).3 Moreover, in some countries, such as Canada, where core 
inflation is used as an operational guide, the “official” core has been replaced by a 
supposedly better one, showing the dangers of relying too much on any specific core 
measure. Indeed, if there is a consensus about core inflation today it is that no specific 
measure dominates others in all dimensions and criteria [see Hogan et al. (2001) for 
Canada, Mankikar and Paisley (2002) for the U.K, and Rich and Steindel (2007) for 
the U.S.]. 
Core inflation also seems to have lost terrain among economists. For instance, 
after being one of its main enthusiasts [e.g. Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) and Cecchetti 
(1997)], Cecchetti (2006) has become disappointed with their actual performance. He 
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 Since the rationale for excluding interest rate effects are different from that for excluding volatile 
items, those indexes can hardly be classified as core inflation. 
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notes that “The techniques [for construction of core measures] rely on various 
statistical methods, but in the end all we are doing is forecasting – and not terribly 
good forecasting at that.” He concludes that policymakers “… should turn their 
attention to forecasts of headline inflation and stop focusing on core measures.” Bean 
(2006) calls to attention the theoretical inconsistency of traditional exclusion core 
measures (i.e. that excludes food and energy). He argues that “… to me renders 
suspect the practice of focusing on measures of core inflation that strip out energy 
prices, while retaining the falling goods prices.” King (2007) agrees and warns that 
“… measures of ‘core inflation’ that strip out certain prices can be highly 
misleading.” Nonetheless, the so-called exclusion core is precisely the most popular 
one, especially in the U.S. 
Marques et al. (2003) and Clinton (2006) follow a different road and question 
the supposedly theoretical predictive content of core inflation. They argue that it is not 
suitable for forecasting headline inflation in the near term, since the latter is heavily 
influenced by transitory factors, which is exactly that part of inflation that core 
inflation tries to ignore.4 On the other hand there are also core inflation enthusiasts, 
such as Blinder (2006), who argues emphatically on the central role that core inflation 
should play in monetary policy-making. According to him one main reason why 
central banks should follow closely (traditional) core inflation is not because it is less 
volatile than headline inflation but rather because “… monetary policy is unlikely to 
have much leverage over energy (or food) prices; so it makes sense to focus the 
central bank’s attention on the inflation it can actually do something about.” 
Moreover, according to him a key property of core inflation is exactly its forecasting 
ability. Finally, there are also those, such as Mishkin (2007), who recognise the poor 
performance of traditional core measures but nonetheless still think they have an 
important role to play in monetary policy. For example, he argues that by focusing on 
core inflation policy responses will produce less volatility in both output and inflation.  
Central banks, in their turn, have been criticised for putting too much emphasis 
on core inflation when setting monetary policy. For example, Laidler and Aba (2000) 
criticised the supposedly complacent reaction of the Central Bank of Canada in face 
of rising headline inflation, since core inflation continued to be well behaved. Using 
                                                 
4
 Clinton also argues that core inflation is not a good predictor of headline inflation in Canada, and that 
the inflation target itself does a better job in that regard than the core. 
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the same reasoning, The Economist (2007) criticised both the Fed and the market for 
putting too much emphasis on core inflation while headline inflation was rising. 
The suspicion about core inflation seems to lie essentially on its actual 
performance rather than in its theoretical underpinnings, even though, as seen above, 
the latter is not uncontroversial. Moreover, although most criticism refers to the 
traditional core measure, it also encompasses other types of cores. For instance, the 
OECD (2005) analysed the performance of a variety of core measures in several 
countries and, in many cases, they bear problematic features. In various cases headline 
inflation was not attracted to core inflation, what, in theory, should happen with good 
cores. Evidence of bias, among other problems, was also widespread. Smith (2004) 
also found evidence of bias among several core measures for the U.S., Rich and 
Steindel (2005) found evidence that “… no core measure does an outstanding job 
forecasting CPI inflation.”, while Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) found evidence for the 
U.S. that headline inflation is a better predictor of itself than the traditional ex-food & 
energy core. Some disturbing evidence comes from Gavin and Mandal (2002), whose 
findings suggest that food prices do contain useful information about trend inflation in 
the U.S. Moreover, they find that food prices are a better inflation predictor (for 
inflation in the next two years) than the traditional core inflation, which exclude them. 
Given the above dissent it should not come as a surprise that different central 
banks face and use core inflation in different ways. While the Fed put great emphasis 
on core inflation when moving interest rates, both the Bank of England and the ECB 
focus mainly on headline inflation, while the Bank of Canada uses it as an operational 
guide. In Brazil, although the emphasis is on headline inflation, the Central Bank 
calculates three different measures of core inflation, which are used – along with 
many other indicators – to help assessing current and future inflation developments. 
Notwithstanding the different emphasis given by central banks and the dispute 
around it, there is no doubt that core inflation plays an important role – sometimes 
central – in modern monetary policy. Therefore, it is imperative for policymakers to 
be aware of and to have an accurate view about the real capabilities of core inflation 
measures; that is, their virtues and limitations. 
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3 – Desirable Statistical Properties of a Good Core Inflation Measure 
 
Regardless of whether the dissent about core inflation is theoretically or 
empirically based, it is largely agreed that an ideal core inflation measure should 
possess at least some desirable statistical features. First, it seems obvious to argue that 
a good core inflation measure should not be biased. Bias is usually assessed in two 
ways. In the first, the means of headline and core inflation are calculated for a given 
period and the results are compared in order to check if they diverge in a statistically 
significant way. The hypotheses can be stated as: 
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and test the null joint hypothesis that 0=α  and 1=β . If the null is accepted it means 
that the core under analysis is not biased. 
Second, a good measure of core inflation should be able to capture/track as 
closely as possible trend inflation.6 Two questions arise here. First, how is trend 
inflation determined? Second, what do we mean by “as closely as possible”? As to the 
first question, economists have devised several methods and identification 
assumptions to extract a trend from a given time series. A very popular method is the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Another one is the unobserved components (UC) model, 
which uses the Kalman Filter (KF). In the core inflation literature, however, the most 
used method is simply the centred moving average (CMA) of headline inflation, a 
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 It should be called to attention that this test is sometimes carried out using the ANOVA F-statistic 
(e.g. Catte and Sløk, 2005). However, since the two variables are likely to have different variances 
(indeed, a major objective of core inflation measures is lower variance compared to headline inflation) 
this testing procedure is inappropriate. 
6
 Note that the criterion is tightly linked to the first one, since the ability to track trend inflation depends 
on whether or not core inflation is biased.  
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procedure advocated by Bryan and Cecchetti (1994). In this case, how many periods 
should one use? In other words, how smooth or persistent should the trend be?  
The higher the number of periods used in the calculations the smoother/more 
persistent will the trend be and the smaller the influence of the most recent 
observations. This remark brings out two issues. First, there is no such a thing like 
“the” trend: trends differ according both to the period they refer to and to the method 
chosen. There are shorter, medium and longer term trends, and they could coexist 
while being different. If inflation is stable they tend to coincide. Second, which 
horizon should the central bank care the most? One could argue that by focusing on 
the long-term inflation trend the central bank could end up accommodating persistent 
deviations of headline inflation from the target (trend). On the other hand, by putting 
too much emphasis on a volatile trend – a feature usually associated with shorter-term 
trends – the central bank could increase both output and inflation volatility 
unnecessarily. Since the central bank main interest lies on inflation developments over 
the near future, that is, over the horizon it can actually act upon, the shorter to medium 
term inflation trend seems to be the most relevant for monetary policy. 
As to the second question, two criteria are usually used to gauge how close 
core inflation is from trend inflation. The first is the root mean square error (RMSE) 
(equation 3), and the second is the mean absolute deviation (MAD) (equation 4). The 
core measure that minimizes the chosen criterion would, in principle, be the best one. 
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Finally, and most importantly, it is largely agreed (although there is no 
consensus) that core inflation will be most useful to monetary policy if it helps to 
predict headline inflation.7 More precisely, given the information set available to a 
forecaster, one would like to know if the additional information provided by core 
inflation helps to predict inflation. However, given that that information set is a 
potentially very large one, the assessment will be done within a narrower scope. It 
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 Ideally, core inflation should also act as a predictor of inflation turning points, a valuable information 
for any policymaker. 
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seems obvious to argue that, among the myriad of variables that are part of the 
information set used by a forecaster, the history of inflation is certainly present. 
Therefore, the test used here aims at checking if, conditional on past headline inflation 
rates, core inflation brings any useful information to explain future headline inflation.8 
Given the well documented fact that simple univariate inflation forecasting models are 
a tough benchmark to beat (see, for example, Canova, 2002), this should not be a 
serious shortcoming when doing inference. Indeed, if core inflation is not informative 
when one controls for inflation lags, it is unlikely to be once other variables are added 
to the forecasting model. 
Hence, one way to assess this requirement is to use a specification like (5). 
Three forecast horizons will be focused: 2, 3 and 4 quarters.9 
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quarterly headline and core inflation. Hence, equation (5) provides multi-step 
forecasts for inflation over several horizons, using quarterly data.10 One consequence 
of such a set up is that forecasting errors will have moving average dynamics, since 
forecast periods overlap. This feature makes inference unreliable, and potentially 
wrong, since traditional standard errors statistics are invalid. 
One way to avoid this problem is to change the frequency of the data to match 
the forecasting horizon desired, according to equation (6).11 Note that, although in this 
case there is no “overlapping problem”, one is constraining quarterly coefficients 
within each period to be the same, a restriction that either may be invalid or could lead 
to loss of relevant information. 
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 This test is known in the literature as the Granger-“causality” test. 
9
 Estimates for Brazil suggest that changes in the interest rate begin to act upon the inflation rate in a 
statistically significant way somewhere between nine and twelve months ahead. 
10
 Note that regardless of the frequency of the data used in the models, the core inflation measures used 
in this paper are constructed using monthly data, which are then aggregated to lower frequency data. 
11
 Now k indicates both the frequency of the data and of the forecast. 
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which is operationally viable only when the division by k gives an integer. 
The literature also lists other features/criteria as being important, but we 
believe the above ones are the most relevant. Moreover, some of them do not have our 
sympathy. For instance, it is argued that a good core inflation measure should be 
simple and easily understandable by the “public” (e.g. Rich & Steindel, 2005). This 
argument seems highly overstated. How easily understandable the concepts of, say, 
asymmetric trimmed mean or dynamic factor models are for a layman? Actually, the 
“public” often has difficulty in understanding some simple economic concepts such as 
the very concept of inflation. Moreover, many issues central to monetary policy-
making are complex even to economists, let alone the “public”. 
It is also argued that core inflation should be less volatile than headline 
inflation. We do not have any quarrel with that, but we feel this requirement has been 
overly emphasized. Indeed, for the vast majority of available methods core inflation 
will be less volatile than inflation by construction. Finally, some of the tests found in 
the literature do not really tackle the issue under analysis. For example, the following 
“naïve” model is used to check whether recent changes in core inflation are 
informative about future changes in headline inflation (see Catte and Sløk, 2005). 
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where, for example, k = 3, 6, 9 and 12 when monthly data is used. 
A major problem here is that (7) is very likely to be mis-specified, preventing 
any reliable inference. For example, it does not even include lags of headline or core 
inflation. Also, changes in core inflation enter in a very restricted way (e.g. non-
overlapping changes are not possible to be included). Hence it is not surprising that 
for most of the cases and countries Catte and Sløk (2005) found the β coefficient to be 
insignificant. The lack of significance does not say much, since changes in core 
inflation could actually be helpful in predicting inflation once other relevant variables 
are added to the model. Indeed, in the few cases where the regressor was significant, 
its sign was theoretically wrong, a typical symptom of the omitted variable problem. 
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4 – Core Inflation in Brazil 
 
The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) currently calculates three core inflation 
measures. The first one is a traditional exclusion core in which food (at home), energy 
and regulated & administered prices are excluded. Regulated prices are those prices 
that follow specific rules laid out in contracts. They refer to utilities, such as 
electricity and telephony, which have been privatised as of 1995. In its turn, 
administered prices are those prices that although not being set by contracts are 
determined by the Government (whether federal, state or municipal). Remedy, fuel 
prices (with the exception of ethanol) and municipal taxes are some examples. 
The second measure is a (symmetrical) trimmed mean core, where 20% of 
prices changes are excluded from both tails of the monthly price distribution. The 
third core is a smoothed (symmetrical) trimmed mean core, where mainly regulated & 
administered prices changes are “smoothed” before the trim.12 Since those prices are 
changed infrequently, when the change comes it is usually (relatively) large and, 
therefore, likely to be trimmed. However, after being smoothed (i.e. the change is 
divided equally in the current and next eleven months) the trim becomes much less 
likely.13 
The calculation of core inflation measures in Brazil started after the 
implementation of the inflation targeting (IT) framework in mid-1999.14 This was not 
a coincidence; on the contrary, core measures were devised to help monetary policy 
decisions within the new monetary policy framework. The first time the concept of 
core inflation was officially mentioned by the BCB was in the notes of the 45o 
Copom’s (monetary policy committee) meeting, which took place in March 2000, 
when it referred to a CPI core measure calculated by the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation.15,16 The first time the BCB referred to a core inflation measure of its own 
was in the notes of the 50o Copom’s meeting (August 2000), when it referred to the 
                                                 
12
 Tobacco and tuition are smoothed although their prices are not regulated or administered. For further 
details on the methodology see Figueiredo (2001). 
13
 For conciseness, throughout the rest of the paper the denomination “trimmed mean core” will be used 
to refer to the non-smoothed (symmetrical) version of the trimmed mean core. 
14
 The inflation targeting framework was officially adopted in Brazil through the Decree No 3088 of  
June 21st 1999. 
15
 To a summary of the first steps on core inflation measurement in Brazil outside the BCB see BCB 
(2000) and Figueiredo (2001). 
16
 In the notes of the 46o and 47o Copom’s meetings the BCB also mentioned the concept of core 
inflation, even though it those cases it did not make it clear what specific measure it was referring to.  
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smoothed trimmed mean core. One year later, in the notes of the 63o Copom’s 
meeting (September 2001), the BCB introduced the exclusion core, which purges the 
IPCA from food at home, energy and administered & regulated prices. Finally, the 
BCB mentioned for the first time the trimmed mean core in the June 2003 Inflation 
Report. 
This section assesses how those three core inflation measures have fared so far 
according to the criteria laid out above. Their performances will be assessed for the 
post-stabilization period, since high inflation heavily distorts relative prices and could 
affect the results in an idiosyncratic way. More precisely, the sample refers to the 
1996–2008 period.17 Within that period, we are particularly interested in their 
performances during the inflation targeting period (i.e. 1999–2008). 
Table 1 shows the unbiasedness test results (together with some descriptive 
statistics). The results are far from encouraging. For example, two out of the three 
core inflation measures – the exclusion and the trimmed mean cores – show bias for 
both the whole sample and the inflation targeting period.18 Not only those biases are 
statistically significant but their sizes are economically relevant. While the exclusion 
core bears a bias of 1.2 p.p. during the IT period, the trimmed mean’s bias reaches 1.6 
p.p. In addition, although not statistically significant, the smoothed trimmed mean 
core delivers a bias of half of a percentage point during the IT period, a magnitude 
that is economically relevant (i.e. it suffices to both interfere in agents’ planning and 
central bank’s monetary policy).19 Finally, the results from Table 1 show that, on 
average, all core inflation measures have underestimated IPCA inflation for more than 
one decade. The underestimation was particularly severe in the first years of the 
floating/IT regime (1999–2002) – precisely when they were most needed – when the 
bias reached almost three percentage points for the exclusion and trimmed mean 
cores!20 Moreover, even the smoothed trimmed core, which is unbiased when the 
longer sample is considered, was seriously biased in that four-year period. 
                                                 
17
 The Real Plan was implemented in July 1994. The exclusion and trimmed mean cores’ historical 
series go back until January 1995; however, the data for the smoothed trimmed mean core is available 
from January 1996 onwards only. 
18
 Of course, since both periods overlap a great deal one expects results to be similar. 
19
 At this point the following remark by Blinder (1997) is useful: “For I can tell you from personal 
experience that a full percentage point change in the inflation rate is a very big deal to central bankers 
in low-inflation countries. In fact, central bankers in these circles sweat blood over whether the 
underlying inflation rate may have risen by a quarter percentage point!” 
20
 For a more detailed explanation regarding the behaviour of the exclusion core after the floating see 
da Silva Filho (2007), section 4. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for IPCA Core Inflation Measures* 
Measures of Core Inflation 
Monthly 
Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
Annual bias 
(p.p.) 
Unbiasedness test 
(p-value) 
  1996 - 2008 
Headline inflation 0.54 0.45 0.84 - - 
Exclusion 0.45 0.31 0.68 -1.09 0.04 
Smoothed Trimmed mean 0.53 0.28 0.52 -0.15 0.77 
Trimmed mean 0.41 0.28 0.68 -1.61 0.00 
  1999 - 2008 
Headline inflation 0.57 0.45 0.79 - - 
Exclusion 0.47 0.27 0.58 -1.19 0.04 
Smoothed Trimmed mean 0.53 0.22 0.42 -0.51 0.35 
Trimmed mean 0.44 0.27 0.61 -1.62 0.00 
   1999 - 2002  
Headline inflation 0.70 0.54 0.77 -  
Exclusion 0.47 0.30 0.63 -2.79 0.01 
Smoothed Trimmed mean 0.54 0.22 0.40 -1.92 0.06 
Trimmed mean 0.46 0.30 0.65 -2.91 0.01 
(*) Shaded areas highlight statistical significant tests at 6%. 
 
At this point a warning is required. Focusing only on the existence of bias over 
an extended period of time – a pervasive feature in the literature – could be 
misleading, and generally leads one to miss the point.21 As Figure 1 shows, although 
the smoothed trimmed mean core has a small (statistically speaking) bias when a 
longer sample is considered, its dynamics is troublesome. More specifically, it is 
piecewise biased over long enough periods of time – a feature quite relevant for 
monetary policy – but in opposite directions such that they offset each other in longer 
samples. 
Note that the smoothed trimmed mean core sizably underestimated headline 
inflation during the four years following the floating (1999–2002), and overestimated 
it in the next four years (2003–2006). That could, for example, lead to a too lenient 
monetary policy in the first period and an unnecessarily tight monetary policy in the 
second one, should the central bank put too much emphasis on core inflation. 
Moreover, if economic agents also put a great deal of emphasis on core inflation when 
forming inflation expectations, those will be biased too.22 Finally, and most 
                                                 
21
 Rich and Steindel (2007), for example, argue that “A core inflation measure should have a 
comparable mean to the goal inflation series over a long period of time.” 
22
 See da Silva Filho (2006) for evidence on inflation forecasting errors in Brazil after the 
implementation of the IT framework. That evidence is compatible with the hypothesis raised here. 
 importantly, the evidence shows
in purging only transitory shocks from headline inflation.
Smoothed Trimmed Mean
 
Table 2  shows how closely each core inflation measure tracks trend headline 
inflation (assuming it is well represented by a centred moving average). As can be 
seen, there is an overwhelming dominanc
this criterion. It easily beats the exclusion and trimmed mean cores 
similar performances – in both samples, criteria and regardless of the number of 
months used in the moving average. Its relative vol
inflation’s.24 
Table 3 uncovers interesting evidence on the usefulness of core inflation in 
explaining headline inflation over the near future in Brazil. The first line shows the 
estimation results of a restricted version of equation (5) 
headline inflation enter (i.e. the betas are set to zero). The other lines show the results 
when each core inflation measure is added to the restricted specification separately. 
Two results stand out: first, the extremely low R
                                                
23
 Indeed, as Figure 5 shows, during the 1996
cores is quite large (-1.9 p.p. and 
former turns out not to be biased. And, although the bias of the latter is smaller (
to be quite relevant. 
24
 Rigorously, the term relative volatility applies when both headline and core inflation share the same 
trend. Since we have evidence that core measures are biased, the lower volatility could be, to a large 
extent, due to the bias itself. 
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 that core inflation measures have not been successful 
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and core inflation over the previous four quarters are not very informative about 
inflation over the next 2, 3 and 4 quarters, during the sample analyzed, for Brazil. 
More strikingly, when core inflation is added to the model the equation’s standard 
error actually increases, with the exception of the trimmed mean core in the 2 and 3-
quarter ahead cases. 
Table 2 
Deviations from Trend IPCA Inflation 
Measures of Core Inflation RMSE1 MAD2 
Centered moving average Centered moving average 
  
13-month 25-month 37-month 13-month 25-month 37-month 
  
1996 – 2008 
Exclusion 0.72** 0.69** 0.69** 0.79** 0.81* 0.81* 
Smoothed Trimmed mean 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.52*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 
Trimmed mean 0.68*** 0.70*** 0.72* 0.74** 0.78** 0.82* 
  
1999 – 2008 
Exclusion 0.71 0.65* 0.75* 0.80* 0.78* 0.75* 
Smoothed Trimmed mean 0.48*** 0.41*** 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.44** 0.44** 
Trimmed mean 0.66*** 0.65** 0.77** 0.74** 0.72* 0.73* 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, in Diebold & Mariano’s test for predictive 
accuracy. 
(1) Root mean square error relative to that of headline inflation. 
(2)  Mean absolute deviation relative to that of headline inflation. 
Table 3 
Goodness of Fit and F-tests Results 
 
2Q Ahead 3Q Ahead 4Q Ahead 
 
R2 67
 
F1 F2 R2 67
 
F1 F2 R2 67
 
F1 F2 
Headline 
inflation 0.08 1.22 - - 0.07 1.43 - - 0.09 1.71 - - 
Exclusion 0.11 1.23 0.52 0.00/0.21 0.10 1.47 0.71 0.02/0.45 0.12 1.78 0.94 0.07/0.66 
Smoothed 
Trimmed 
mean 
0.11 1.25 0.62 0.00/0.10 0.09 1.46 0.44 0.00/0.12 0.11 1.74 0.39 0.00/0.25 
Trimmed 
mean 0.13 1.16 0.11 0.00/0.09 0.10 1.40 0.23 0.00/0.02 0.12 1.74 0.60 0.00/0.20 
(1) Tests are based on equation (5) augmented by intervention variables. The following dummies were required 
for model congruence (apart from autocorrelation), in the 2, 3 and 4-quarter ahead cases, respectively: 2002.4 
and 2003.1, the latter plus 2003.2 and the latter plus 2003.3. F1 shows the p-value of the traditional F-test, where 
the null is that all core inflation lags have zero coefficients. F2 refers to the p-value when the F-test uses 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (HACSE). The first p-value comes from the F-
statistic that uses errors based on the procedure of Andrews (1991), while the second is based on the procedure 
of Newey-West (1987). In order to highlight the low explanatory power of both headline and core inflation over 
future inflation, the R2 statistic comes from equation (5), since the inclusion of dummies produces a sharp 
increase in that statistic and could induce one to think that headline and core inflation (over the last four quarters) 
explain a sizable part of future inflation. Sigma stands for the equation’s standard error. Shaded areas indicate the 
cases when the two corrected F statistics reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level. The estimation 
sample is 1996.4 – 2008.4. 
 
Second, Table 3 also displays F-test statistics – whose null is that all the 
coefficients attached to lags of core inflation are zero – and the results are intriguing. 
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When traditional F-tests are (incorrectly) used they easily accept the null in all cases. 
Nevertheless, when Andrews’ (1991) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors (HACSE) are used the null is rejected in all cases. Although the 
presence of autocorrelation can sharply distort standard test statistics, it is eye-
catching the substantial changes in the F-statistic in the 2-quarter ahead case, when 
the degree of autocorrelation is lower (in the sense that the overlap is of just one 
period).25 At this point it is important to say that, apart from autocorrelation, all 
models passed easily in all diagnostic tests.26,27 Hence, when standard errors are 
corrected using the Andrews procedure, F-tests suggest that all three core inflation 
measures are helpful in explaining inflation in the near future. 
However, when standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure, the qualitative results revert once again. Indeed, with the exception of the 
trimmed mean core for the 3-quarter ahead horizon – when the Andrews and Newey-
West based F-tests concur at 5% significance level but conflict with the traditional F-
test – the Newey-West based F-tests and traditional F-tests are always in agreement. 
In other words: not only did the Newey-West correction end up not making any 
difference (compared to the traditional F-test) in terms of qualitative inference, but its 
results conflicted with the F-test based on the Andrews procedure.28 This fact is 
unsettling. 
Despite the relevance of this conflicting evidence on the current investigation 
it requires a research of its own, which is not the aim here. It also calls for caution 
when inference is made using corrected standard errors, whose properties are usually 
well-established asymptotically only.29 Even so, Table 4 tries to uncover which 
evidence appears to be more reliable by displaying estimation results when lower 
frequency data is used, in order to avoid overlapping observations [i.e. equation (6)] 
Two horizons are focused: six-month ahead (i.e. semi-annual data) and one year 
ahead (i.e. annual data). The results suggest that the Newey-West correction has 
                                                 
25
 As expected, the p-value for the fourth order autocorrelation test decreases the longer the forecasting 
horizon is, since the overlap increases. 
26
 The following diagnostic tests were carried out in all estimations: Autocorrelation, ARCH, 
Normality, Hetero test, hetero-X test and RESET test. For details see Hendry and Doornik (2001). 
27
 It should be stressed that although the corrected standard errors also deal with heterocedasticity there 
were no signs of it in all models (the p-value in all models are always greater than 0.5, and usually 
above 0.7). 
28
 The F-test based on Andrews correction is from the PcGive software while the F-test based on 
Newey-West correction is from EViews. 
29
 And they are optimal only for particular cases.  
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apparently been more successful in dealing with the effects of overlapping 
observations on test statistics than Andrews’, since the null is accepted in all cases. 
Hence, the evidence seems to imply that the three core inflation measures are not very 
informative in explaining inflation developments up to one year ahead. 
Table 4 
Goodness of Fit and F-tests Results (Non Overlapping Observations) 
 
Semi-Annual Data Annual Data 
 
R2 67
 
F1 F2 R2 67
 
F1 F2 
Headline inflation 0.06 1.45 - - 0.06 2.78 - - 
Exclusion 0.11 1.48 0.54 0.13/0.34 0.14 2.80 0.38 0.13 
Smoothed Trimmed mean 0.06 1.52 0.86 0.74/0.86 0.11 2.86 0.51 0.12 
Trimmed mean 0.13 1.42 0.24 0.17/0.40 0.09 2.89 0.66 0.39 
(1) Tests are based on equation (5) augmented by intervention variables. A dummy for the second half of 2002 
was required for model congruence in models with semi-annual data. No dummy was needed for annual 
frequency models. F-tests are explained in Table 3, where comments are also made for the R2 statistic and sigma 
– the equation’s standard error. Note that since annual models use only one lag, both the Andrews and Newey 
West procedure give the same value of the F-test statistic. Estimation sample is 1997.1 – 2008.2 when semi-
annual data is used and 1997 – 2008 when annual data is utilized. 
 
Although Table 4’s estimation results come from models without overlapping 
observations – that passed in all diagnostics tests – it is interesting to check how the 
Andrews and Newey-West based F-statistics behave in this case. One would expect 
that in the absence of those problems they would be very similar to standard F-tests. 
However, even though the qualitative evidence remained the same at traditional 
significance levels, as expected, it is interesting to notice the large changes that can 
occur between the test statistics when there is no signs of autocorrelation and 
heterocedasticity. For example, the p-value for the exclusion core in the semi-annual 
data case reduces from 0.54 to 0.13, while the p-value for the trimmed mean core 
reduces from 0.51 to 0.12 in the annual data case. This evidence calls, once again, for 
caution when calculating tests statistics that use corrected standard errors. Finally, it is 
important to notice that when annual data is used in all cases lagged annual headline 
and core inflation were not statistically significant. This evidence concurs with the F-
test results from quarterly models, whose lags encompass four quarters. 
 
5 – Improving Core Inflation Measurement in Brazil 
 
The evidence laid out in the last section showed that both the exclusion and 
trimmed mean cores have not been doing a good job since they are biased and do not 
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seem helpful to predict headline inflation. Moreover, they also have problems in 
tracking trend inflation. As to the smoothed trimmed mean core, although its tracking 
ability is better it is piecewise biased during relevant periods of time, as Figure 1  
shows. Moreover, it also does not seem helpful in predicting headline inflation. 
The main (statistical) reasoning for excluding food and energy from headline 
inflation is that they are deemed to be highly volatile. There is also an implicitly and 
crucial (economic) reasoning, according to which those prices are mainly driven by 
temporary supply shocks. Figure 2  shows the volatility of the nineteen sub-groups 
that are part of the IPCA, and scrutinizes – for the three sub-periods defined below – 
if the volatility argument is corroborated by the data.30 
The first sub-period goes from January 1995 until December 1998. This is 
basically the period after the implementation of the Real Plan, during which there was 
a fixed exchange rate (crawling peg) regime. The second sub-period goes from 
January 1999, when the exchange rate has begun to float, until December 2002, just 
before the beginning of the first mandate of President Lula da Silva. This period was 
marked by sharp exchange rate depreciation. The last sub-period begins in January 
2003 and goes until December 2007, during which economic stabilization was 
consolidated and the exchange rate appreciated considerably. 
As can be seen, the food at home sub-group is placed at the eighth place on the 
grid during the first period (1995–1998). Moreover, its volatility is pretty similar, for 
example, to transportation, clothing and health services sub-groups. During the second 
period (1999–2002), it was indeed among the most volatile sub-groups, and held the 
third place. However, during the last period (2003–2008) it went back on the line to 
the sixth place. Therefore, contrary to common intuition, food – at least in its most 
aggregate level – is not among the most volatile sub-groups of the IPCA.31 Thus, 
based on the volatility argument, one sees that the food at home sub-group should not 
had been excluded from the headline index. 
As to the energy “goods” notice that they are located in two sub-groups: in the 
“fuels and energy” sub-group – formed exclusively by energy items (household fuel 
and electricity) – and in the “motor fuel” item, within the transportation sub-group, 
                                                 
30
 The IPCA components are defined, respectively, from the most to the least aggregation level as 
group, sub-group, item and sub-item. 
31
 When the whole sample is taken into consideration food at home is placed in the eighth position. 
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which also comprises the “public transportation” and vehicles items.32 In this case the 
evidence is more supportive. The “fuels and energy” sub-group is placed either in 
second or third place during the sub-periods above. However, at this level of 
disaggregation it is not possible to check the relative volatility of the “motor fuel” 
item, what will be done further below. 
Figure 3 provides more detailed evidence on the food at home sub-group. 
When that group is disaggregated one can immediately see that the volatility among 
the sixteen items that belongs to it varies sharply. Among the most volatile items lie, 
consistently, “potatoes and legume”, vegetable, “cereals and fruit”, as one would 
expect, since those goods are highly affected by weather conditions (i.e. supply 
shocks). On the other hand, items such as “spices, seasoning, condiments and sauces”, 
canned food, bakery products, beverages and “flour and prepared flour mixes” are 
much less volatile. Indeed, the latter are three to eight times less volatile than the 
former, according to the sub-sample chosen. 
Despite being much less volatile it might well be that the least volatility food 
at home items remain more volatile than other items within the IPCA. Figure 4 tries to 
answer that question by listing all the 52 items that make the IPCA.33 As can be seen, 
although the bulk of the most volatile items do come from the food at home sub-
group, many of them are not part of that club. For example, the lower volatility group 
mentioned above is usually placed outside the 15 most volatile items of the IPCA. In 
some cases they are far back on the line like beverages and “spices, seasoning, 
condiments and sauces”. Hence many items from the food at home sub-group can 
hardly be excluded based on the volatility argument. 
One can also see that the three items pertaining to the energy “group” (motor 
fuel, household fuel and electricity) were indeed located among the most volatile 
items in the first period, but the situation has changed markedly ever since. For 
example, in the last two periods electricity was not even among the 14 most volatile 
items. Indeed, it was placed in 18th place in the second period and 15th in the third, 
hardly meritorious to be excluded based on the volatility argument. As to the 
                                                 
32
 The “fuels and energy” sub-group is formed by the following sub-items: electricity, coal and cooking 
gas. The “motor fuel” item includes the following sub-items: gasoline, ethanol, diesel and vehicular 
gas. 
33
 Notice that three items were created in August 1999. Hence the number of items in the first sub 
sample is smaller; while in the second sub-sample average volatilities for those three items began to be 
calculated in August and not in January like the others 
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household fuel item, while it was among the most volatile in the first two periods, it 
was displaced to the 18th position in the last period. 
As explained in the last section, besides food and energy goods regulated and 
administered prices (several of which pertaining to the energy “goods” group) are also 
purged from the Brazilian exclusion core. Among those, the most representative ones 
belong to the following items: communications, public transportation, electricity, 
motor fuel and household fuel. Figure 3 provides some interesting findings on their 
regard. First, with the exception of public transportation – which is far from being 
among the most volatile items in any of the three periods – the other regulated and 
administered prices were among the most volatile group during the first period. 
Second, the (relative) volatility of those prices has reduced over the sample, 
influenced by the decreasing volatility in energy “goods”. Indeed, among the seven 
most volatile items, four came from the regulated and administered prices in the first 
period, two in the second period and just one (in sixth place) in the last period, which 
leads us to the next crucial evidence: the nature of volatility shocks presented 
important changes over time in Brazil, suggesting that any strategy that excludes a 
particular group of items could end up doing a poor job if those groups do not 
maintain themselves among the most volatile ones. 
The evidence so far lead us to conclude that, with the exception of part of the 
food at home items and the “motor fuels” item, many items within the food and 
energy group have been excluded based on a reasoning that have actually not been 
corroborated by the data. The same holds true for some items in the administered and 
regulated prices group, such as public transportation, communications and electricity. 
The last two were very volatile in the first period, but not in the other two. 
However, it should be called to attention that volatility is not the rationale 
behind the removal of regulated and administered prices from the IPCA. The two 
main (related) arguments are that those prices: a) are not affected by monetary policy; 
b) are not determined by market forces but rather by contracts or other factors (e.g. 
politically motivated). However, these arguments seem pretty fragile.34 Moreover, 
even if were true it would probably not support their exclusion. Although monetary 
policy does not affect those prices in the very short run, it does affect them at longer 
horizons. Indeed, in Brazil regulated prices are changed on an annual basis as laid out 
                                                 
34
 Note that using this same (fallacious) reasoning one could also argue that wages are not affected by 
monetary policy, since most wage contracts are set for pre-determined periods. 
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in contracts, and since those contracts are tightly linked to past inflation they are 
indeed affected by monetary policy, but with a lag.35 In its turn, administered prices 
such as health insurance are adjusted taking heavily into account past inflation.  
More crucially, since regulated and administered prices are very persistent, 
being rigid downwards, their changes have usually a permanent nature and, in this 
case, we certainly would not want to exclude them from the index, otherwise the core 
would be biased. Indeed, da Silva Filho (2007) calls to attention not only the 
diverging trends between the exclusion core index and the IPCA, reflecting the rather 
permanent nature of those price changes, but also the asymmetric response of 
regulated prices to changes in the exchange rate. 
Not by coincidence, the evidence put forward in the last section showed that 
the exclusion and the trimmed mean cores present large biases. Indeed, in the 
exclusion core, administered and regulated prices are excluded by construction, and in 
the trimmed mean case, since those prices are changed infrequently (once a year), 
once the change occurs, given the large relative monthly changes, they are also 
“automatically” excluded. 
Given the above unsatisfactory picture, a new exclusion core, with sounder 
statistical and economic foundations, is proposed. There are two main differences 
between the current and the new exclusion core (named IPCAEX1). First, the 
statistical foundation of the latter is stronger. More precisely: instead of just claiming 
that certain prices are more volatile than others, we use an objective statistical 
criterion to both select and exclude the most volatile items. Second, as argued above, 
we do not concur that administered and regulated prices should be purged from the 
IPCA, quite on contrary, those are precisely the prices that should not be excluded 
from the index, given the permanent nature of the “shocks” they are subjected to. 
Their exclusion was particularly harmful during periods of sharp exchange rate 
depreciation, such as after the floating, in 1999, and in the pre-election scare, in 2002, 
since their prices are strongly influenced by the exchange rate. 
Table 5 lists all IPCA items whose relative price volatilities are above two 
standard deviations, during the 1995.1–2007.12 period (last column). This feature is 
considered to be a necessary condition, yet not sufficient, for a given item to be 
excluded. Sixteen items fulfilled that condition. As one can see, the list is largely 
                                                 
35
 The price index that indexes most of the contracts is heavily influenced by the exchange rate, which 
is also affected by monetary policy. 
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dominated by food items, although energy items, regulated and administered prices 
and some “outsiders” (tobacco and tuition) are also present. This evidence is exactly 
the same one already portrayed in Figures 2 to 4. 
Table 5 
IPCA: Relative Volatility for Selected Items 
Items 01/1995 12/1998 
01/1999 
01/2002 
01/2003 
12/2007 
01/1995 
12/2007 
Potatoes and legume 7.98 5.78 9.13 7.84 
Communications 11.92 1.99 1.43 6.82 
Vegetables 7.95 4.48 5.11 5.95 
Cereals 5.30 3.79 3.26 4.12 
Household fuel 3.78 4.01 1.05 3.19 
Fruits  3.11 2.22 3.66 3.12 
Motor fuel 3.10 3.70 2.32 3.07 
Fish 3.96 2.71 2.24 3.00 
Poultry and eggs 2.34 3.54 2.62 2.89 
Sugar and sweets 1.54 3.78 2.27 2.75 
Electricity 5.69 1.68 1.26 2.63 
Fats and oils 2.30 3.47 1.89 2.63 
Dairy products 1.90 2.04 2.50 2.19 
Tuition 2.72 1.86 1.81 2.18 
Meat 2.17 2.05 2.07 2.14 
Tobacco products 2.75 1.93 1.41 2.05 
 
However, items’ volatility sometimes changes radically from one period to 
another, as seen above. For example, although communication holds the second place 
overall, it was not among the most volatile in the second and third sub-periods. Hence, 
another desirable criterion should be consistency: the item should be consistently 
among the most volatile ones (in the current case for at least two out of the three sub-
periods) to be excluded. This additional requirement discards the following items: 
communications, electricity, tuition and tobacco. In all those cases, the high overall 
volatility was entirely due to the high volatility observed in the first period. Moreover, 
both communications and electricity are regulated prices and, as argued before, should 
not be excluded from the index. 
Notice, however, that the household and motor fuel items – which are largely 
administered prices and also pertain to the energy group – ended up fulfilling the two 
statistical conditions for exclusion.36 Nonetheless, according to the economic 
                                                 
36
 The household fuel item contains the following sub-items: coal, bottled cooking gas and town gas. 
The second one, which is the most relevant in the CPI basket, is controlled by the Government, while 
the third one is a regulated price. The importance of the first one is negligible. The motor fuel item 
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reasoning above they should not be excluded. At this point some digression is 
necessary. Contrary to regulated prices, which are changed once a year and are very 
rigid downwards, one could claim that household and motor fuel should be excluded 
since they are likely to be very volatile as they are tightly linked to oil prices. 
Although this is certainly true for many countries, one should note that: first, in Brazil 
fuel prices are basically set by the Government and are changed infrequently. Hence 
they bear a high degree of persistence.37 Second, commodity prices, especially oil 
prices, are often subjected to persistent trends, in opposition to fresh food prices. In 
this case, despite the high volatility, their exclusion is not advisable. As a result, the 
IPCAEX1 excludes 10 items from the headline index instead of the approximately 23 
that are excluded from the actual exclusion core. Note that all the items come from the 
food at home sub-group. As a result, while the current core excluded, on average, 
46.2% of the IPCA during the 1999-2007 period, the former would have excluded just 
10.6%. 
Despite our theoretical preference for not excluding household and motor fuel 
items, we also calculate another core that also excludes them (called IPCAEX2), in 
order to check its performance relatively to IPCAEX1. In this case the number of 
excluded items rises from 10 to 12, and the average weight excluded during the 1999-
2007 period rises from 10.6% to 17.3%. A final word of caution is required. Even 
though the IPCAEX1 and IPCAEX2 have sounder statistical and economic 
foundations than the actual exclusion core, the nature and size of price shocks can 
change from time to time as shown above, so that they could become biased as well. 
However, we do believe that not only they are less likely to be biased than the current 
exclusion core, but the bias would be smaller should it happen. This fact calls for the 
importance of checking periodically if the excluded items remain being the most 
volatile ones. Nonetheless, we believe that either the IPCAEX1 or the IPCAEX2 bear 
important improvements over the actual exclusion core. 
An alternative for mitigating such a problem is to exclude prices based on a 
clear and timely statistical criterion, rather than on their nature. This is the rationale 
behind the trimmed mean core, where prices are purged based solely on the relative 
                                                                                                                                            
contains the following sub-items: ethanol, which is actually a free price, gasoline, diesel and vehicle 
gas. The last three are controlled by the Government (i.e. administered). 
37
 For example, oil prices have fallen from US$ 150 just before the worsening of the sub-prime crisis in 
September 2007 to around US$ 45-50 in March 2009, and during this whole period domestic gasoline 
prices remained unchanged in Brazil.  
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size of their cross-section variation. However, even in that case if a certain “good” 
suffers persistent large price changes, it will be repeatedly excluded and the core 
could end up biased as well. Indeed, this is precisely what is behind the dismal 
performance of the trimmed mean core in Brazil. Since regulated and administered 
prices are changed infrequently, when the changes come they are usually large and, 
therefore, excluded. Hence, when the prices of those goods began to sharply increase 
following the large depreciations of 1999 and 2002, they became systematically 
excluded from the IPCA, and the trimmed mean core turned out to be biased. That is 
why the smoothed trimmed mean has a much better performance; because large 
monthly changes were equally split among the current and the next eleven months 
and, therefore, were less likely to be excluded. 
Another possibility is that instead of excluding the most volatile items from 
the IPCA, some re-weighting scheme is applied to the index so that the most volatile 
items are downplayed, but not excluded. The literature lists some possibilities. One 
option is the so-called double-weighted index, in which the expenditure weights are 
multiplied by the inverse of the item’s volatility, so that the importance of the most 
volatile items is downplayed, and vice-versa. Another possibility is just to use the 
(inverse) volatility of a given item as its weight. 
Hence, besides the IPCAEX1 and the IPCAEX2 two other new core measures 
are calculated: a double weighted core (IPCADP) and a volatility core (IPCAV). The 
IPCADP is calculated as follows. 
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 is the core inflation at period t, tiw ,  and tiw ,~  are the (normalized) expenditure 
weights of each component i of the IPCA and the associated new (double) weight at 
period t and ti ,σ  is the moving average volatility involving a window of j months of 
the component i at time t. 
The IPCAV is calculated as follows: 
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After some preliminary assessment about the behaviour of the above two 
measures for different moving average volatilities we chose a four-year window for 
calculating those averages. Hence the core measures below are calculated using a 
forty eight month moving average when calculating relative volatilities for each item. 
Finally, since the performance of the IPCAV was disappointing its results are not 
shown. 
 
6 – Empirical Results 
 
Given the dismal performance of the current core inflation measures, one 
would like to know how well the new measures laid out above fare according to the 
three criteria described in Section 2. Table 6 provides the first assessment and the 
results seem encouraging. All three new measures do not have statistically significant 
biases. In the case of the IPCAEX1 the bias is virtually zero. The IPCAEX2 and the 
IPCADP show similar performances during the IT period and, although not 
negligible, their bias’ magnitude does not seem to be so economically relevant. Notice 
that during the IT period, the size of the largest bias among the new cores (0.34 p.p. 
from the IPCAEX2) is one third lower than the smallest bias among the current core 
measures (0.51 p.p. from the smoothed trimmed mean). In addition, notice that apart 
from the IPCAEX1 the new cores also share a tendency to underestimate headline 
inflation, although to a much lesser degree. Finally, when the problematic 1999–2002 
period is considered all three new cores remain statistically unbiased, especially the 
IPCAEX1. However, the bias for both the IPCAEX2 (-1.28) and the IPCADP (-1.26) 
is now economically relevant. 
Table 7 provides the results for the tracking accuracy criterion. As before, we 
have a clear, although different, winner. For both samples, both criteria and all 
horizons the IPCAEX2 now presents the best results. We also have a clear ordering, 
since the second place in all dimensions goes to the IPCADP, while the worst result 
comes from the IPCAEX1. When the comparison includes the current cores the 
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IPCAEX2 ranks second overall (after the smoothed trimmed mean). The IPCADP 
shares the third place along with the trimmed mean core, while the last position goes 
to the IPCAEX1. Hence, there is a clear trade-off between bias and variance for the 
ICPAEX1, the least biased among all.38 This result hinges on its minimalist nature 
since it excludes, on average, only 10.6% from the IPCA, during the 1999–2007 
period. Although the IPCAEX1 has our theoretical preference, the IPCAEX2 seems to 
deliver a better balance between bias an variance.39 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for the New Core Inflation Measures 
Measures of Core Inflation 
Montlhy 
Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
Annual 
bias 
(p.p.) 
Unbiasenedess 
test 
(p-value) 
  1996 - 2008 
Headline inflation 0.54 0.45 0.84 - - 
IPCAEX1 0.55 0.41 0.75 0.09 0.88 
IPCAEX2 0.52 0.34 0.65 -0.23 0.67 
IPCADP 0.50 0.34 0.68 -0.48 0.38 
  1999 - 2008 
Headline inflation 0.57 0.45 0.79 - - 
IPCAEX1 0.57 0.39 0.69 -0.02 0.98 
IPCAEX2 0.54 0.30 0.56 -0.34 0.56 
IPCADP 0.55 0.31 0.57 -0.32 0.59 
  1999 – 2002 
Headline inflation 0.70 0.54 0.77 -  
IPCAEX1 0.68 0.44 0.65 -0.23 0.85 
IPCAEX2 0.60 0.32 0.53 -1.28 0.24 
IPCADP 0.60 0.36 0.60 -1.26 0.27 
 
Finally, notice that, during the IT period, when the MSE criterion is chosen, 
there is a sharp increase in “volatility” when the 37-month moving average is used as 
a proxy for trend inflation, in all cases. This result suggests that both the 13 and 25-
month moving averages are more appropriate for proxying the “true” trend of IPCA 
inflation. 
It is worthwhile to call to attention that besides the remarkable performance of 
the IPCAEX1 on the bias criterion the dynamics of its bias is in accordance to what 
one expects from a good core measure, as Figure 5 shows. Indeed, positive and 
negative “errors” often alternate each other, in opposition to what happens with the 
IPCAEX2 and the IPCADP. This evidence could lead one to argue that in Brazil the 
                                                 
38
 One easy way to deal with the higher relative volatility of the IPCAEX1 is to use its moving average. 
39
 From a theoretical viewpoint it is interesting to notice that if the optimum core inflation is indeed a 
minimalist one, then one would expect a good core inflation to be volatile. In that case, a high RMSE 
could be a natural outcome rather than a shortcoming. 
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“optimum” core would conceptually be so close to headline inflation that actual 
inflation would be the best “core” of itself. This claim seems more convincing when 
one is reminded of the well-known difficulties in extracting the inflation noise from 
signal along with the pervasiveness of several kinds of economic shocks to the 
Brazilian economy. Both facts would favour a minimalist core. Such a reading shares 
some common elements with claims such as that of Clinton’s (2006), who argues, for 
Canada, that “Under the official inflation targeting regime, core inflation is not a good 
predictor of headline inflation, in principle or in practice.”, or yet that of Bryan and 
Cecchetti’s (1994), who find evidence for the U.S. that headline inflation is a better 
predictor of itself than the traditional ex-food & energy core.  
Table 7 
New Core Measures: Deviations from Trend IPCA Inflation 
Measures of Core Inflation RMSE1 MAD2 
Centered moving average Centered moving average 
  
13-month 25-month 37-month 13-month 25-month 37-month 
  
1996 – 2008 
IPCAEX1 0.86** 0.87* 0.87** 0.87*** 0.91** 0.92* 
IPCAEX2 0.65*** 0.66** 0.67** 0.70*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 
IPCADP 0.70*** 0.72** 0.74** 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 
  
1999 – 2008 
IPCAEX1 0.85** 0.86* 0.96* 0.87** 0.91* 0.90* 
IPCAEX2 0.58** 0.60** 0.74** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.66*** 
IPCADP 0.66** 0.67** 0.81** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, in Diebold & Mariano’s test for predictive accuracy. 
(1) Root mean square error relative to that of headline inflation. 
(2)  Mean absolute deviation relative to that of headline inflation. 
 
Table 8 provides evidence on how useful the new cores are to explain headline 
inflation over the near future in Brazil. The main results are: first, although the R2 
statistics remain extremely low they increased up to 50% in comparison to the “old” 
cores (see Table 3), for the IPCAEX1 and IPCAEX2 cases. In both cases the smallest 
gains occur in the 4-quarter ahead horizon. Also, the ICPADP does not bring any 
improvement over the current calculated cores, according to this criterion; second, 
apart from the 4-quarter ahead horizon, there also appears to be some gains when 
regression standard errors are compared (for the IPCAEX1 and IPCAEX2 cases). 
More importantly, in some cases the inclusion of core inflation now produces a 
decrease in the sigmas. 
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Indeed, in contrast to the previous results, where the sigmas actually increased, 
now they fell in the 2-quarter ahead horizon for both the IPCAEX1 and IPCAEX2, 
and in the 3-quarter ahead case for the former. Hence, the gains brought by the new 
cores are concentrated in the 2-quarter ahead horizon, precisely when the monetary 
policy is less capable of affecting inflation. The above results suggest that predicting 
inflation at longer horizons is a tough task in Brazil, a result that has already been 
documented by da Silva Filho (2006). 
Table 8 
New Cores: Goodness of Fit and F-tests Results 
 
2Q Ahead 3Q Ahead 4Q Ahead 
 
R2 67
 
F1 F2 R2 67
 
F1 F2 R2 67
 
F1 F2 
Headline inflation 0.08 1.22 - - 0.07 1.43 - - 0.09 1.71 - - 
IPCAEX1 0.16 1.20 0.28 0.00/0.21 0.15 1.40 0.23 0.02/0.10 0.14 1.76 0.79 0.14/0.76 
IPCAEX2 0.17 1.18 0.18 0.00/0.43 0.12 1.44 0.44 0.04/0.59 0.15 1.74 0.64 0.02/0.44 
IPCADP 0.12 1.21 0.37 0.00/0.05 0.09 1.46 0.64 0.00/0.40 0.11 1.77 0.83 0.36/0.89 
(1) See comments on Table 3. 
Table 9 
Goodness of Fit and F-tests Results (Non Overlapping Observations) 
 
Semi-Annual Data Annual Data 
 
R2 67
 
F1 F2 R2 67
 
F1 F2 
Headline inflation 0.06 1.45 - - 0.06 2.78 - - 
IPCAEX1 0.09 1.51 0.73 0.60/0.77 0.12 2.85 0.49 0.19 
IPCAEX2 0.09 1.52 0.84 0.88/0.94 0.32 2.51 0.11 0.02 
IPCADP 0.09 1.49 0.57 0.35/0.58 0.06 2.93 0.98 0.98 
 (1)  See comments on Table 4. 
 
Notice that the evidence regarding the F-test statistics remains unchanged, in 
particular the conflict between the Andrews-based and Newey-West based F-statistics 
and the failure of the F-tests to reject the null. As did Table 4 for the “old” cores, 
Table 9 provides evidence on the conflicting F-test statistics. As before, it suggests 
that the Newey-West correction seems to be more successful in dealing with the 
effects of overlapping observations than Andrews’. It also shows – given the non 
negligible difference in the p-values of the F-tests in some cases – that test statistics 
based on that kind of correction should be regarded with care. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that both the IPCAEX1 and IPCAEX2 show 
improvements over the currently calculated cores, especially in regard to the current 
exclusion and trimmed mean cores. Therefore, the former should be preferred to the 
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latter. Nonetheless, the new cores remain not being informative in explaining inflation 
developments, although they add more explanatory power than the old cores. 
The results above along with the evidence presented in Section 2 should be 
seen as a warning on the capabilities of core inflation in practice. Even after building 
sounder measures of core inflation (especially regarding the exclusion core, which is 
by far the most used measure) they ended up being of little help in explaining future 
inflation. Although these results only concerns Brazil and the analysis did not cover 
all types of core inflation, elsewhere research shows similar evidence for other type of 
measures and countries as well (see Section 2). Even so, central banks – some more 
than others – and the market continue to follow core inflation closely. 
  
7 – Conclusion 
 
This paper unveils unsettling evidence on the performance of the closely-
watched core inflation measures calculated by the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB): the 
exclusion, trimmed mean and smoothed trimmed mean cores. Moreover, even after 
building other measures with sounder statistical and economic underpinnings they 
remained being of little use as an inflation forecasting tool. Consequently, this paper 
supports the emerging scepticism found in literature regarding core inflation’s real 
capabilities as a gauge of inflationary pressures. In our understanding this scepticism 
should be seen as one of the main contribution of the paper. 
 On the theoretical side – apart from the smoothed trimmed mean – we show 
that the core measures calculated by the BCB bear important economic and statistical 
shortcomings. For example, the exclusion core ignores administered & regulated 
prices. However those prices are precisely the ones that should not be purged since 
they show a large degree of persistency and are rigid downwards. They also end up 
being excluded by the trimmed mean core, since as they change once a year when 
those changes occur they are relatively large. Hence, it is not surprising that both 
cores have been seriously biased. 
On practical grounds – partially as a consequence of the way they were 
devised – they do not meet those statistical criteria believed a good core measure 
should have. There is evidence either of bias or poor dynamics. The worst 
performances took place in the period following the floating, exactly when the 
supposedly less noisy information stemmed from core inflation was most needed. 
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Most importantly, no evidence was found that they are helpful in explaining inflation 
in the near term. In fact, surprisingly, when core inflation is added to specifications 
that already control for headline inflation, the equation standard error actually 
increase. 
Three new cores were constructed and assessed: two new exclusion cores, 
built upon firmer economic and statistical foundations, and a double weighted core. 
Their assessment shows some improvements, especially in the bias criterion. 
However, they still lack one key property: the ability to help forecasting inflation. 
This result calls attention to the fact that faring well in some statistical criteria such as 
unbiasedness and track accuracy is not sufficient for a given core inflation to be 
valuable as an inflation leading indicator. 
Although we have investigated only certain types of core inflation (among 
them the most used by central banks), the evidence revealed here along with that 
found for other countries and core’s types shows that both the BCB and the market 
should use core inflation with great care. Results also suggest that predicting near 
term inflation in Brazil is a real challenge, since both headline and core inflation lags 
have low explanatory power over short to medium term inflation. 
On a side note, the paper also calls to attention the inconsistencies that arise 
between tests statistics corrected by the Andrews and (the widely the used) Newey-
West procedures, as well as the large differences that sometimes happen between 
those test statistics and standard ones in the absence of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. That is, inference from test statistics that use HACSE when there 
are overlapping observations should be regarded with care. 
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Appendix 
Figure 2 
IPCA Sub-Groups: Volatility 
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Figure 3 
IPCA Food at Home Items: Volatility 
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Figure 4 
IPCA Items – Volatility 
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Figure 5 
Annual Bias of Core Inflation Measures: Dynamics 
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